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Straightjacketing migrant rescuers? The code of 
conduct on maritime NGOs
Eugenio Cusumano
international relations, institute for History, University of leiden, leiden, the netherlands
ABSTRACT
In July 2017, Italy drafted an EU-sponsored code of conduct aimed at regulating 
non-governmental migrant rescuing NGOs offshore Libya. The code makes 
permission for NGO vessels to disembark migrants in Italian ports conditional on 
collaborating in the fight against smugglers and accepting the presence of law 
enforcement personnel on board. This article investigates the inception, content 
and likely consequences of the Code, arguing that most of its provisions are either 
redundant or counterproductive. As suggested by scholarship on civil–military 
cooperation and maritime rescuing, the code as it stands would only violate 
humanitarian principles without increasing existing rescuing capabilities.
Introduction
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have provided a crucial contribution 
to mitigating the loss of life along the Central Mediterranean migratory route. 
Since 2014, 10 different NGOs have deployed boats at sea to conduct Search 
and Rescue (SAR) operations, rescuing over 100,000 migrants. NGO vessels have 
become the largest provider of SAR in the Mediterranean, rescuing around 38% 
of the total number of migrants departing from Libya between January and 
June 2017.
The non-governmental provision of migrant rescuing, however, has become 
increasingly contentious. Italian frustration with the lack of EU-wide solidarity 
in the reception of asylum seekers and the growing criticism against of NGOs’ 
activities, accused of being a pull factor of migration and a catalyst of human 
smuggling, have resulted in an ongoing effort to impose limitations of non-gov-
ernmental migrant rescuing, epitomised by the drafting of a code of conduct 
(hereinafter simply referred to as the Code) to be signed by maritime NGOs. 
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As repeatedly stressed by the Italian Ministry of Interior, failure to abide by its 
provisions may entail serious consequences, including the refusal to authorize 
the disembarkation of migrants in Italian ports. Five out of the nine migrant 
rescuing organizations operating offshore Libya in the summer of 2017 have 
signed the Code at the time of writing. One of the non-signatory organizations, 
Jugend Rettet, is now under investigation for abetting illegal immigration.
As I wrote in a previous study, while international waters may ostensibly 
appear as an ideal humanitarian space, migrant rescuing has already forced 
NGOs to compromise on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independ-
ence that underlie humanitarian action (Cusumano 2017). The newly drafted 
Code further encroaches upon these principles, compromising NGOs’ ability to 
conduct humanitarian relief at sea free of political interference.
This article argues that the code of conduct on migrant rescuing is either 
redundant or problematic. As it stands, the Code only infringes on humanitarian 
principles without either increasing NGOs’ rescuing effectiveness or strengthen-
ing law enforcement organizations’ ability to combat human smugglers. To this 
end, the ensuing sections briefly review the reasons underlying the tightening 
grip over maritime NGOs, examine the provisions of the code and explore its 
problematic implications.
From praise to delegitimization: The Italian and European approach to 
migrant rescuing NGOs
In the summer of 2014, when the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) launched 
the first non-governmental SAR campaign, rescuing migrants from drowning 
had been established as a priority by Italian decision-makers. Even when the 
Italian SAR mission Mare Nostrum was interrupted due to Italian frustration 
with the lack of EU burden sharing and other states’ criticism that the operation 
was a pull factor of illegal migrations, the belief that SAR remained a legal and 
ethical imperative, however, was never called into question. Consequently, when 
it became clear that Frontex operation Triton did not have the resources and 
mandate to replace Mare Nostrum in addressing the humanitarian crisis, Italian 
authorities welcomed NGOs as an important multiplier of their SAR capabilities.
Eventually, however, Italian authorities’ approach to non-governmental 
rescuing became more ambivalent. The 2016 increase in arrivals from Libya, 
together with EU failure to provide Italy with meaningful burden sharing in the 
reception of asylum seekers, created growing migration crisis fatigue among the 
Italian public. Consequently, the activities of NGOs – grown from 3 to 9 between 
2015 and 2016 – have increasingly been seen as suspicious and problematic. As 
aptly described in a recent analysis of Italian media coverage of migrant rescu-
ing, the Mediterranean angels ‘lost their wings’ (Barretta et al. 2017).
Statements from Frontex, which repeatedly criticized NGOs as a pull factor of 
migration and a catalyst of smuggling – reinforced the impression that non-gov-
ernmental maritime rescuing was responsible for a dramatic increase in migrant 
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arrivals which Italy was being left to face alone. In this climate, the accusations 
made by Catania’s attorney general Carmelo Zuccaro – who denounced that 
some charities could be colluding with human smugglers – further contributed 
to delegitimizing non-governmental migrant rescuing. While these accusations 
were partly retracted as ‘working hypotheses’, populist parties like the Northern 
League and the Five Stars Movement called for a crackdown on NGOs activities. 
In April 2017, the Italian Senate Defence committee investigation acknowledged 
that maritime rescuing remained a duty and no evidence of rescuers’ misbehav-
iour existed, but simultaneously called for ensuring that all NGOs would follow 
clear rules in order to preserve Italy’s control over its borders.
At the June 2017 European Council meeting in Tallinn, Italian requests for 
greater solidarity in the reception of migrants fell once again on deaf ears. While 
EU institutions praised Italian efforts, no EU country allowed for the disem-
barkation of migrants in their ports. The Italian Government only obtained EU 
support for the writing of a code of conduct disciplining non-governmental 
SAR. Drafted by officials in the Italian Ministry of Interior in consultation with the 
EU Commission, the Code purportedly endeavours to achieve ‘greater rescuing 
effectiveness’. As the next section explains, however, most of its provisions are 
either redundant or problematic. The Code as it stands both encroaches upon 
the humanitarian space and weakens existing non-governmental rescuing 
capabilities.
The code of conduct: Compass or shackles?
A first draft of the Code started to circulate in mid-July 2017. Slightly amended 
in response to humanitarian organizations’ concerns, the final version of the 
document was submitted for NGOs to sign on the 1 August. The Code is based 
on 13 provisions, briefly examined below.
Firstly, NGOs should not enter Libyan territorial waters unless in exceptional 
circumstances and under previous authorization. The Code justifies this measure 
as necessary not to encroach upon the sovereignty of Libya. However, since 
migrant boats rescued by Libyan authorities are taken back to Libya, such a 
request also reflects Italian and EU willingness to rely on the EU-trained Libyan 
Coast Guard as a migrant interdiction force. Due to widespread evidence that 
those taken back to Libya would be subjected to inhumane treatment, NGOs do 
not consider Libya as an appropriate place of safety for migrants. Consequently, 
NGO vessels have frequently tried to reach boats in distress before the Libyan 
Coast Guard to ensure that migrants would be taken to a place of safety in Italy 
instead. However, due to the often aggressive behaviour of Libyan Coast Guard 
units, NGOs entered Tripoli’s territorial sea only in very sporadic circumstances 
and after consulting the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). 
Consequently, this measure appears to be largely redundant.
Secondly, NGOs should not interfere with vessel satellite tracking devices. In 
the past, these geolocalisation systems were sometimes turned off by merchant 
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ships in order to render themselves invisible to MRCCs and avoid being obliged 
to participate in SAR (Aarstad 2015). It is therefore ironic that NGOs that have 
migrant rescuing as their raison d’etre are being accused of following the same 
practice. NGOs have denied the accusation of deliberately turn off their vessel 
tracking devices to avoid showing that they were operating too close to Libyan 
coasts, stating that the occasional failure of the system to track their position is 
only due to insufficient satellite coverage. Whether these accusations are fac-
tually correct or not, turning satellite tracking devices off is already an offence 
under maritime law and can be prosecuted by vessels’ flag state. Hence, this 
provision too appears unnecessary.
NGOs should also commit ‘not to make communications or send light sig-
nals to facilitate the departure and embarkation of vessels carrying migrants’. 
Although the effort to prevent rescuers from inadvertently facilitating smugglers 
is understandable, the appropriate use of light signals and sirens at sea is an 
obligation under international maritime law and is vital to ensure the safety 
of navigation and the conduct of SAR operations. As migrant boats have no 
navigation lights, dinghies departing from Libya at night can only be spotted 
by means of spotlights aboard rescuing vessels. When SAR operations occur at 
night, rendering themselves visible may be necessary for rescue vessels to save 
lives. For this reason, the Code concedes that the commitment to not signal NGO 
vessels’ presence should occur without prejudice to preserving the safety of life.
NGOs should also demonstrate that their personnel are trained to conduct 
rescuing operations and the vessel meets all the technical conditions neces-
sary to conduct SAR. As many NGOs are small charities relying on reconverted 
fishing vessels manned by volunteers, ascertaining their ability to conduct res-
cuing operations appears justified. However, NGOs have always acknowledged 
that their presence at sea is a second-best option exclusively motivated by the 
absence of more effective state-led SAR missions. While volunteers operating 
on old, small vessels are not ideal maritime rescuers, their activities are still pref-
erable to the lack of any SAR assets other than merchant vessels occasionally 
transiting through the region, often ill-equipped for large-scale rescue missions. 
Indeed, as the Code acknowledges, even vessels that are ill-suited for SAR can 
remain involved in rescue missions in cases of force majeure such as distress 
situations.
The Code also asks NGO vessels’ shipmasters to notify their involvement 
in SAR operations to their flag state. This measure arguably reflects Italians’ 
attempt to internationalize the crisis and obtain greater burden sharing from 
the international community. However, the flag states of NGO ships are presently 
Italy itself (as in the case of MSF’s Prudence and Save the Children’s Vos Hestia), 
northern European states located too far away from distress situations like the 
Netherlands (as in the case of the Sea-Watch 2, Sea-Eye and Jugend Rettet’s 
Iuventa), or states used as convenience flags like Belize and Gibraltar (as in the 
MOAS’ Phoenix and SOS-Méditerranée’s Acquarius). Notifying rescuing activities 
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to flag states’ MRCC only adds to NGOs’ obligations without translating into a 
greater involvement of these countries in the conduct of SAR operations.
NGOs are also expected to constantly inform the Italian MRCC and execute 
its instructions. As stressed by the Code itself, these are already obligations 
under international maritime law. Moreover, such commitments appear to have 
already been followed. As consistently acknowledged by the Italian Coast Guard, 
all migrant rescuing NGOs have established an effective working relationship 
with the MRCC. While miscommunications have sometimes occurred, these are 
unlikely to be solved by merely signing a code. Smoother communication and 
coordination can only been achieved by concrete actions such as joint train-
ing, the exchange of best practices and the standardization of communication 
platforms.
Finally, NGOs are expected to declare all their sources of financing to both the 
flag state and the Italian Government. As stressed by several NGOs’ spokesper-
sons, since all migrant rescuing NGOs are registered charities, all their budgets 
are publicly available. Consequently, all organizations are already in compliance 
with this provision. Reinstating this request in the Code may only further delegit-
imize NGOs by conveying the impression that their operations lack transparency 
or are guided by obscure financial and political motives.
All the commitments listed above have been accepted by NGOs, which 
stressed they are already following both these provisions and all other rele-
vant international and domestic legal obligations. Hence, while most of these 
provisions appear redundant or insinuatory, none of them is inherently prob-
lematic. The Code, however, also contains three provisions that are either in 
danger of reducing rescuing effectiveness or blatantly violate the principles of 
independence, neutrality and impartiality that underlie humanitarian action.
The seventh provision of the Code expects NGOs ‘not to transfer those on 
rescued vessels… NGO vessels should as a rule complete the operation by dis-
embarking survivors in a safe port’. Non-governmental rescuing operations pres-
ently follow two models: while organizations with larger vessels both rescue 
migrants and shuttle them to a place of safety, charities with smaller ships simply 
spot migrants in distress, temporarily hosting migrants on board until a larger 
vessel transports them to land (Cusumano 2017). The coexistence of these two 
models allows for a healthy division of labour, ensuring that the departure of 
larger NGO ships to Italian ports does not create a gap in rescuing capabilities 
offshore Libya. Obliging NGOs with small and slow ships to conduct disembarka-
tions may only create a gap in existing rescuing capabilities and place additional 
strain on non-governmental rescuing assets. Disembarking migrants in Italian 
ports may be too demanding and too costly for small organizations, ultimately 
making their presence offshore Libya impossible.
The Code also obliges NGOs to loyally cooperate with the public security 
authorities of their intended place of disembarkation, transmitting all relevant 
information in advance. For most part, providing this information beforehand 
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allows for a smoother disembarkation and providing timely medical care where 
needed. Sensitive information like the presence of suspect smugglers, however, 
may result in prosecutions and impact on certain people’s prospects for asylum. 
As such, NGOs see this requirement as a violation of the principle of impartiality, 
which obliges them to treat all people in need equally. Furthermore, NGOs are 
requested to collect the makeshift boats and engines of migrant boats. This pro-
vision obliges NGOs to conduct a law enforcement role they are neither trained 
for nor equipped to conduct, encroaching upon the humanitarian principle of 
neutrality. As smugglers, facilitators and armed fishermen often venture close to 
rescue operations to retrieve engines and empty boats, this attempt to co-opt 
NGOs into EU anti-smuggling efforts may have serious consequences for the 
safety of NGO personnel.
Finally, NGOs are expected to ‘receive on board, upon request by Italian 
authorities, judicial police officers ... conducting investigations related to 
migrant smuggling’. Not only is this request potentially conducive to disputes 
between Italy, NGO vessels’  flag states, and Libyan authorities and militias, who 
may see in the presence of Italian police officers close to their shores a threat to 
their sovereignty or an opportunity for hostile actions against a former colonial 
power. The presence of police agents aboard vessels would clearly infringe the 
neutrality of the humanitarian space. Having armed personnel aboard endan-
gers the safety of NGO ships and violates the policy of organizations like MSF, 
which has consistently adhered to a ‘no arms’ policy in all its hospitals worldwide. 
While the possibility to have police officers board NGO vessels unarmed has 
been discussed, it was ultimately discarded as incompatible with Italian police 
standard operating procedures. Consequently, this provision remains a major 
bone of contention between the Italian Government and some NGOs.
Conclusions
At the time of writing, five NGOs have accepted signing the Code. MOAS, Save 
the Children, and Pro-Activa have immediately signed the document, reluctantly 
followed by Sea-Eye. SOS-Méditerranée, too, eventually accepted to subscribe 
after obtaining the drafting of an additional document specifying that police 
personnel will only be allowed onboard if they have a warrant, and migrants’ 
disembarkations on other boats will remain possible if authorized by the Italian 
Coast Guard. MSF, Sea-Watch, Jugend Rettet and LifeBoat have refused to sign 
the Code.
The consequences of refusing to sign the code are still unclear. The Italian 
Ministry of Interior itself acknowledged that the Code is not a binding legal 
instrument. However, the Code should not be dismissed as an empty declaration 
of intentions. NGOs ultimately depend on Italian authorities for the authoriza-
tion to disembark migrants, and they are subjected to Italian jurisdiction when 
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in Italian waters and ports. Therefore, support from Italian law enforcement 
agencies is vital for NGOs to continue operating.
Even if the Italian Minister of Interior, backed by the European Commission, 
reinstated the threat of closing Italian ports to non-signatory organizations, such 
a measure would be illegal under maritime and refugee law, and is therefore 
unlikely. Italian authorities, however, would still be able to hinder NGOs’ work 
by subtler means such as, for instance, imposing inspections on NGO ships 
upon entering Italian ports or requiring their ships to disembark migrants in 
ports located far away in mainland Italy, thereby imposing huge fuel costs and 
logistical hurdles on non-governmental rescuers.
Moreover, the activities of non-signatory organizations may be subjected to 
closer scrutiny by Italian prosecutors. At the moment of writing, Jugend Rettet’s 
Iuventa has been confiscated by Italian authorities on suspicion that the crew 
was abetting irregular immigration, although, as acknowledged by attorneys, 
their motives were ‘essentially humanitarian’. (Viviano and Ziniti 2017) Even 
if no evidence of unlawful behaviour is found, such investigations may stop 
rescue vessels from operating for long periods of time and impose costs that 
small organizations cannot handle. The German NGO Cap Anamur, which was 
prosecuted after disembarking a group of migrants to an Italian port in 2005, is 
a case in point. By the time they were acquitted, the organization had already 
suspended its activities.
Even if the Italian Government will not follow suit to its threats and the 
Code will remain a declaratory exercise to appease the public’s migration crisis 
fatigue before the start of the 2018 electoral campaign, the document as it 
stands is counterproductive. As amply demonstrated by scholarship on civil–
military cooperation, greater coordination between NGOs and law enforce-
ment organizations can hardly be achieved through binding obligations that 
encroach upon humanitarians’ neutrality and independence. On the contrary, 
meaningful cooperation is more likely to be obtained by engaging in a regular 
dialogue, fostering mutual trust by means of regular meetings, joint training 
and an exchange of best practices. Involving NGOs in initiatives such as the 
EU-sponsored Shade Med (SHared Awareness and DEconfliction) conferences 
and the Una Vis (one force) roundtables offered a valuable step in that direction. 
The Una Vis meetings chaired by the Italian Coast Guard, aimed at drafting a set 
of best practices in consultation with NGOs, were however discontinued once 
the Italian Government opted for drafting the Code.
Forcing NGOs to sign a code of conduct by threatening ill-specified con-
sequences in case of refusal is hardly conducive to greater coordination. On 
the contrary, since various organizations refused to cave in but remain free to 
continue operating, the Code only increases coordination hurdles by generat-
ing confusion on how Italian authorities should interact with both signatory 
and non-signatory NGOs. By conveying the impression that NGOs have been 
engaging in unlawful behaviour, the Code only contributes to delegitimizing 
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non-governmental rescuing, which may have unpredictable consequences on 
public order. Since April 2017, the right-wing organization Defend Europe has 
endeavoured to stop NGOs by chartering a vessel to monitor humanitarians 
and support Tripoli’s Coast Guard in returning migrants to Libya. This situation 
only increases confusion and creates frictions across NGOs and between NGOs, 
Italian authorities, and other civil society organizations, ultimately reducing the 
effectiveness of both rescuing and anti-smuggling operations.
Furthermore, imposing unnecessary restrictions on NGOs’ activities and forc-
ing them to compromise on humanitarian principles hardly helps Italy’s appeal 
for greater EU involvement in asylum seekers’ reception and the stabilization 
of Libya. To date, Italy maintained the moral high ground vis-á-vis its European 
partners by fully complying with maritime and refugee law in spite of the bla-
tant lack of EU-wide solidarity. Drafting a document that imposes unnecessary 
restrictions on maritime NGOs only weakens Italy’s position and contributes to 
justifying EU persisting inaction. By asking for EU sponsorship in writing the 
Code, Italy may simply allow its European partners to use their blessing for 
a non-binding document as a surrogate for the lack of any meaningful form 
of solidarity. Ultimately, the Code only reinforces the misleading belief that 
maritime migrations can be reduced by simply straightjacketing rescuers. By 
indulging in the temptation of scapegoating NGOs, Italy may only delay the 
complete overhaul of EU migration policies and the effort to stabilize the EU 
Southern Neighbourhood required to address large-scale migrations across the 
Mediterranean.
In August 2017, the EU-trained Libyan Coast Guard has claimed responsibil-
ity over a large SAR region, warning NGOs against entering the area without 
authorization. While Libya still lacks the capabilities to conduct effective SAR and 
banning NGOs from operating in international waters would be unlawful, the 
Libyan Coast guard already followed suit to its threats by, for instance, shooting 
against Pro-Activa’s vessel on 8 August. As a result, various NGOs temporarily 
suspended their operations, criticizing the EU for condoning the Libyan Coast 
Guard’s aggressive behaviour. The meeting between Italy, Germany, France 
and Spain held in Paris on 27 August suggests that large EU member states 
fully support Italian attempts to externalize migration management by fund-
ing countries in the Sahel region and Libyan municipalities and militias. If so, 
the effort to restrain maritime rescuers described in this article can be read as 
part of a wider EU strategy seeking to deter migrants from crossing the Central 
Mediterranean and rely on the Libyan Coast Guard to interdict those who do. 
The decrease in migrant arrivals to Italy over July and August 2017 seems to 
indicate that this strategy may contribute to reducing crossings. The long-term 
effectiveness, lawfulness and ethical appropriateness of such policies, however, 
remain open to question.
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